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Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929

4 Feb 2026 31 published claims 2 attributable people
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Speakers in the public record

Andrew Ross SorkinTyler Cowen

Claim mix

belief 17evaluation 8uncertainty 2prediction 2recommendation 1commitment 1

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Claim ledger

The useful parts, with receipts.

31 published records

01 / evaluation

It wasn’t that the crash itself was somehow a straight line. It was a series of decisions that were made — in some cases, that weren’t made — by Herbert Hoover, by the Federal Reserve, by a whole bunch of people in Washington and elsewhere that led to, ultimately, unemployment of 25 percent in 1932 and 9,000 banks, I think, by 1933 failing.

“It wasn’t that the crash itself was somehow a straight line. It was a series of decisions that were made — in some cases, that weren’t made — by Herbert Hoover, by the Federal Reserve, by a whole bunch of people in Washington and elsewhere that led to, ultimately, unemployment of 25 percent in 1932 and 9,000 banks, I think, by 1933 failing.”
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03 / belief

While he blamed the broker, if you will, to some degree for suggesting he buy some of these stocks, he ultimately blamed himself, which I think is a very different approach to life than we have today, where there’s always finger-pointing.

“While he blamed the broker, if you will, to some degree for suggesting he buy some of these stocks, he ultimately blamed himself, which I think is a very different approach to life than we have today, where there’s always finger-pointing.”
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04 / uncertainty

You know when they’re going to be called in, hopefully five or ten years or whatever the length of the fund and the loans are, but if it all comes undone at one moment, what happens? That’s like a horror movie to me, but I don’t know the script of that movie or what that book would read like at the moment.

“You know when they’re going to be called in, hopefully five or ten years or whatever the length of the fund and the loans are, but if it all comes undone at one moment, what happens? That’s like a horror movie to me, but I don’t know the script of that movie or what that book would read like at the moment.”
Publisher
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05 / belief

As I was doing that, I was fascinated to learn that the Glass-Steagall bill was not as pure as I think most people in the public thought it really was.

“As I was doing that, I was fascinated to learn that the Glass-Steagall bill was not as pure as I think most people in the public thought it really was.”
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06 / belief

If there’s something like a public option, a series of safe assets, T-bills, FDIC-insured checking accounts, or some equivalent thereof, I think that’s the most we can do for people.

“If there’s something like a public option, a series of safe assets, T-bills, FDIC-insured checking accounts, or some equivalent thereof, I think that’s the most we can do for people.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

09 / belief

The kind of explicit numerical commitment that the FDIC made, say, even Germany thought was a bad idea until relatively recently, so Roosevelt was not as crazy as he sounded. But if you simply have some kind of bank lending and recapitalization program so the money supply doesn’t go bust, that would have been good enough, whether or not it’s exactly the FDIC, at least in my opinion.

“The kind of explicit numerical commitment that the FDIC made, say, even Germany thought was a bad idea until relatively recently, so Roosevelt was not as crazy as he sounded. But if you simply have some kind of bank lending and recapitalization program so the money supply doesn’t go bust, that would have been good enough, whether or not it’s exactly the FDIC, at least in my opinion.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

10 / belief

Talking about the GENIUS Act, what do you think of the idea that we’re going to have private credit and venture capital and private equity funds effectively in either retirement accounts or available to retail investors without the commensurate or similar disclosures that we’ve typically had for publicly traded companies, so these are going to be funds that are going to have private assets in them. They’ll have a NAV, a valuation ostensibly — at least in my mind, unfortunately — being measured by the manager of these funds, so I would like to see more disclosure personally and auditing and the like.

“Talking about the GENIUS Act, what do you think of the idea that we’re going to have private credit and venture capital and private equity funds effectively in either retirement accounts or available to retail investors without the commensurate or similar disclosures that we’ve typically had for publicly traded companies, so these are going to be funds that are going to have private assets in them. They’ll have a NAV, a valuation ostensibly — at least in my mind, unfortunately — being measured by the manager of these funds, so I would like to see more disclosure personally and auditing and the like.”
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11 / belief

I agree with much of what was done, but keep in mind, they’re always sitting down with the Treasury secretary, and these decisions are made jointly, which I would say is inevitable, not a complaint I have.

“I agree with much of what was done, but keep in mind, they’re always sitting down with the Treasury secretary, and these decisions are made jointly, which I would say is inevitable, not a complaint I have.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

12 / belief

I think that I would probably have more consolidation in the banking space, but as a result of that, I would probably also force some of those banks to effectively serve communities and provide loans and other things that they would otherwise not provide.

“I think that I would probably have more consolidation in the banking space, but as a result of that, I would probably also force some of those banks to effectively serve communities and provide loans and other things that they would otherwise not provide.”
Publisher
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13 / belief

I think I agree with that, and it will be necessary. Even with high debt and deficits, there’s only so many T-bills to go around, and we want to use them for everything So, does the rest of the world.

“I think I agree with that, and it will be necessary. Even with high debt and deficits, there’s only so many T-bills to go around, and we want to use them for everything So, does the rest of the world.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

14 / belief

I don’t think I need huge amounts of consolidation to do that, but I think that you look at Silicon Valley Bank as a good example or Signature Bank as a good example of what happens in an environment where you have smaller banks doing things that aren’t necessarily the right things without the backstop that you’d prefer.

“I don’t think I need huge amounts of consolidation to do that, but I think that you look at Silicon Valley Bank as a good example or Signature Bank as a good example of what happens in an environment where you have smaller banks doing things that aren’t necessarily the right things without the backstop that you’d prefer.”
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16 / belief

The good news is Ben Bernanke, I think, learned a lot of these lessons when he was doing his PhD at Princeton and took some of those lessons into the 2008 financial crisis, where he did decide to flood the system with money.

“The good news is Ben Bernanke, I think, learned a lot of these lessons when he was doing his PhD at Princeton and took some of those lessons into the 2008 financial crisis, where he did decide to flood the system with money.”
Publisher
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17 / belief

I would say that if the 2008 financial crisis was a function of too much leverage and debt in the system that effectively brought forward this remarkable growth, a somewhat similar story was taking place in the 1920s in terms of the euphoria around the technology, whether it was automobiles or telecommunications or radio.

“I would say that if the 2008 financial crisis was a function of too much leverage and debt in the system that effectively brought forward this remarkable growth, a somewhat similar story was taking place in the 1920s in terms of the euphoria around the technology, whether it was automobiles or telecommunications or radio.”
Publisher
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19 / belief

I think we need stronger social norms that any new thing, whether it’s sports gambling or something in crypto or whatever, it is gambling of some sort.

“I think we need stronger social norms that any new thing, whether it’s sports gambling or something in crypto or whatever, it is gambling of some sort.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

20 / belief

I think the lesson of what was happening in the 1920s and reading all those diaries suggests that they never were, that they were always concerned about the politics in some regard.

“I think the lesson of what was happening in the 1920s and reading all those diaries suggests that they never were, that they were always concerned about the politics in some regard.”
Publisher
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22 / evaluation

Interestingly, Carter Glass, who I think I told you before was sort of akin to an Elizabeth Warren — the truth is, he would have been a racist Elizabeth Warren because he was from Virginia.

“Interestingly, Carter Glass, who I think I told you before was sort of akin to an Elizabeth Warren — the truth is, he would have been a racist Elizabeth Warren because he was from Virginia.”
Publisher
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23 / evaluation

Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing.

“Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing.”
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24 / prediction

I think two things I would have done is, have something like deposit insurance to begin with, and then do what Sweden did and get off the gold standard as quickly as is necessary, and then, I think, it would have been quite a mild downturn had one done those two things.

“I think two things I would have done is, have something like deposit insurance to begin with, and then do what Sweden did and get off the gold standard as quickly as is necessary, and then, I think, it would have been quite a mild downturn had one done those two things.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

25 / evaluation

I’m not opposed to bank capital requirements, but I don’t know how much capital these small, often non-branched banks could have raised in that environment, so I don’t think that’s the best answer.

“I’m not opposed to bank capital requirements, but I don’t know how much capital these small, often non-branched banks could have raised in that environment, so I don’t think that’s the best answer.”
Speaker
Tyler Cowen
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

26 / evaluation

I think, first of all, a number of those people in the 1920s actually were not that philanthropic yet, and then, of course, lost so much of their fortune that they were really never in a position to be that philanthropic.

“I think, first of all, a number of those people in the 1920s actually were not that philanthropic yet, and then, of course, lost so much of their fortune that they were really never in a position to be that philanthropic.”
Publisher
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27 / prediction

I do worry that, because the stablecoins are going to require the backing of these Treasury bills, that effectively you’re taking that out of the market, which means less credit to the system ultimately, but the alternative also feels risky.

“I do worry that, because the stablecoins are going to require the backing of these Treasury bills, that effectively you’re taking that out of the market, which means less credit to the system ultimately, but the alternative also feels risky.”
Publisher
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28 / evaluation

Look, I think today, you look at the amount of debt that consumers have taken on, that the government has taken on — it’s just wild on a relative basis to what was happening in 1929, but I think that some of that individual basis drove so much of what was happening in the economy and the Roaring Twenties ethos that it really became almost a generational shock for those ordinary Americans who had played the stock market for the first time and lost.

“Look, I think today, you look at the amount of debt that consumers have taken on, that the government has taken on — it’s just wild on a relative basis to what was happening in 1929, but I think that some of that individual basis drove so much of what was happening in the economy and the Roaring Twenties ethos that it really became almost a generational shock for those ordinary Americans who had played the stock market for the first time and lost.”
Publisher
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29 / evaluation

There’s a battle going on about whether to raise interest rates and by how much, but to the extent that they were talking about that, the view, I think, was that they would have to raise them so much that they had almost pretty much convinced themselves that to really tamp speculation down, you have to raise interest rates so much that you, by default, would tip the economy, and they didn’t have the courage to do that.

“There’s a battle going on about whether to raise interest rates and by how much, but to the extent that they were talking about that, the view, I think, was that they would have to raise them so much that they had almost pretty much convinced themselves that to really tamp speculation down, you have to raise interest rates so much that you, by default, would tip the economy, and they didn’t have the courage to do that.”
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