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Andrew Ross Sorkin: belief

4 Feb 2026 Conversations with Tyler Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929

“I don’t think I need huge amounts of consolidation to do that, but I think that you look at Silicon Valley Bank as a good example or Signature Bank as a good example of what happens in an environment where you have smaller banks doing things that aren’t necessarily the right things without the backstop that you’d prefer.”

— Andrew Ross Sorkin

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Speaker
Andrew Ross Sorkin
Attribution
Verified speaker
Claim type
belief
Recorded
4 Feb 2026
Publisher
Conversations with Tyler

Transcript context

…Well, I’m not sure, but let me first point out, there’s been a lot of consolidation since 2009. There’re hardly any new banks. One of them is an Amish bank. Very small number of new banks. The too big to fail doctrine has crowded a lot of deposits into the four biggest banks. Given where we ended up, maybe that’s inevitable, but you want even more consolidation than that? I don’t think I need huge amounts of consolidation to do that, but I think that you look at Silicon Valley Bank as a good example or Signature Bank as a good example of what happens in an environment where you have smaller banks doing things that aren’t necessarily the right things without the backstop that you’d prefer. Now, you could argue that the government turned out to be the backstop. The FDIC turned out to be the backstop, and it worked, so maybe we’re in a good position. The other thing, though, that I do worry about — and I’d also be very curious about where you land — is we now are living in a very bifurcated world as it relates to the loan market and credit market in America, which is, really, post–financial crisis 2008. The private credit business has just exploded. If you’re a company seeking credit, you’re oftentimes not getting it from the bank. You’re getting it from, effectively, the shadow banking system. Some of that shadow banking system is attached to the insurance industry in certain ways. Potentially, it presents all sorts of risks that I’m not sure we all understand. I agree with that. This is my biggest worry. I don’t think I know how to solve it. Formal banks are about 20 percent of lending, so 80 percent is other stuff. It’s regulated in other ways, but it’s not protected by what we would consider our core regulatory structures, and the more you impose capital requirements on banks — FDIC premia, other regulations — you just make that smaller. It’s already trending downwards. That’s why I’m reluctant to induce these banks to do more local community lending. Ideally, you’d like, maybe, the banking system to shrink more slowly than what it’s doing. The stuff you have left — I don’t think you can insure it, really. You hope it’s well enough capitalized. You can’t bail out everything. I don’t think we have any idea what to do about it. What’s your thought on that dilemma?…

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