Velina Tchakarova: evaluation

Transcript context

…First, let’s start with the calculus, what Putin wants. I would like to give you my assessment as to what’s going on there and what’s been going on there for quite some time now. Now, first and foremost, Putin wants the whole of Ukraine, not just one-third of Ukraine or 20 percent. Right now, Russia controls around 18 percent. No, they want all of it, and if it’s necessary, they will just make 10- to 15-year plan how to slowly but surely subjugate the whole of Ukraine. That means, in a similar way, how it’s proceeded since 2014. You had a series of military actions followed by ceasefire, followed by some kind of negotiations, then followed by military actions and rinse-and-repeat tactics. This was the case for almost 10 years. Due to this kind of strategy, Russia was able to militarily control eastern Ukraine, and then it could seize the opportunity to make a move. Of course, I have to say that in my assessment from December 2021, I was pointing to a scenario in which I was absolutely sure that there will be a war, but I actually called this war a limited military operation. I thought that this was my mistake, that the war will start in the east and south of Ukraine. I did not think that Putin would make an all-in move in 2022. This, I must say, was a mistake on my side because, as I said, I was seeing this as a 10- to 15-year plan, how to slowly subjugate the country. Why did he make an all-in move and practically launch the full-scale war from five directions? Well, I think it’s so early to make all these assessments, but certainly, I would argue the regional environment and situation prior to 2022 and also the global environment — think of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Then think of elections in key European countries. In 2021, there was a political vacuum until new governments were built. We had a key election in Germany. This is, as you know, the key provider of support for Ukraine. We had the worst energy crisis in 2021 already looming in Europe. We had the worst, actually, indicator for food prices. This is the FAO index that was already reaching levels of 2011 in December. All of these were regional and global environment indicators that probably led also to this decision. More importantly, what Putin got was also this assurance of full-scale, comprehensive support coming from China. He has been building up these models with Xi Jinping since 2013 when Xi Jinping came to power. He knew that by launching a full-scale war — and this is my personal assessment, of course — he would not just trigger the systemic competition between the United States and China. China at that time was not ready for that kind of fast-speed competition, which meanwhile, as we know, has accelerated to the point of the introduction of tariffs and the decoupling has really, really been triggered. me was not ready for that kind of fast-speed competition, which meanwhile, as we know, has accelerated to the point of the introduction of tariffs and the decoupling has really, really been triggered. But also, in a sense, Putin correctly bet on China, that China, even if not agreeing with the whole decision, actually would support Moscow in this endeavor as it turned out. Going back now to your question — I just wanted to make this clarification — what would be the next steps? What would be next on his agenda? Now, again, what is on his agenda is that he will not give up on attacking Kyiv and attacking Odessa and trying to get as much as possible from Ukraine. If he’s not able, for whatever reasons, we cannot debate now about technical issues, the technicalities of the war. Russia has been adapting, but Russia has also made a lot of mistakes. Ukraine has been adapting in the war, but in reality, right now, they are attacking the second largest city, Kharkiv. Obviously, they’re also attacking Odessa. Like I said, my expectation is that they will be attacking Kyiv again. Let’s assume Putin succeeds in getting a large part of Ukraine, and then we have some sort of negotiations, some sort of ceasefire, and then negotiations. Like I said, this is the best-case scenario from Russia’s point of view because every time there were ceasefire agreements and any kind of negotiations in this case, this will also legitimize the Russian territorial gains. This ceasefire has always been violated. In a sense, this actually plays into the cards of Russia. This is the main question — will Russia actually attack other countries in Europe, right? Am I understanding correctly your question? To split NATO, right? So, if Putin hates NATO and holds a grudge against NATO, he’ll want to take some marginal action that will split the NATO coalition, not so dramatic that everyone is against him. Something like, say, send an army group into eastern Estonia, claim there’s ethnic turmoil, side with the Russian minority, tell a bunch of lies, and then work to subvert the Baltics. Is that in the cards to come next or not?…

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