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28 Aug 2025 Machine Learning Street Talk Michael Timothy Bennett: Defining Intelligence and AGI Approaches
“And if you just if you really wanna make an objective claim or a claim about objective behavior to be more exact, need to formalize what must be true of all abstraction layers, not just a sort of a fixed subset assuming some basic layer that you can identify. Because we we're sort of all interacting with the world through our own abstraction layers anyway.”
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- 28 Aug 2025
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- Machine Learning Street Talk
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…It doesn't make sense to think of a computer program, you know, in a in an absolute sense. Programs have purpose. They have they are situated in a context, in a world, in an environment. And I guess more broadly, you're a big fan of what I would call biologically inspired intelligence, which is that we should create intelligence which, you know, has properties like self organization and delegation and causal learning and and all of this kind of stuff. You know? Because that's much more like how it works in the real world. Yeah. So to solve the so I, you know, had HUDO very briefly as a supervisor during my masters, and then sort of continued working on that sort of thing as I progressed through my PhD. And I wanted to address this sort of subjective complexity, subjective performance thing. And that turned out to be about defining this process of coming up with an abstraction layer. If you think of the Turing machine on which with respect to which IXC is computed as a hunter intelligence. If you think of that as an abstraction layer, then you've got a software mind on a hardware abstraction layer. And then that's sort of interpreted by physics. And in a conventional computer, you've got like Python interpreted by a C program, interpreted by and it just goes all the way down to hardware, but doesn't really stop at hardware. Because hardware is sort of a state of a physical world. And it's interpreted by whatever physical laws according to which that world runs. And you could then say, well, well, knowledge of physics is kind of incomplete. So where does the abstraction end? And if you just if you really wanna make an objective claim or a claim about objective behavior to be more exact, need to formalize what must be true of all abstraction layers, not just a sort of a fixed subset assuming some basic layer that you can identify. Because we we're sort of all interacting with the world through our own abstraction layers anyway. So if we wanna make claims that generalize to other abstraction layers, it sort of helps to have this framework. Wait. Where were we at the start of this? No. No. That that that's great. That makes sense. Let's bring in the the causality component. Right? In your in your paper, you were describing almost like single direction arrows of causality. So, you know, we have the the hardware. We have, you know, like the the c compiler, the interpreter, all of this kind of stuff. And so part of what we were saying is that, you you know, to to build a living, breathing, lifelike system, you you need to sort of like respect the causality. You can't just, you know, take something out Oh. On on its own. But I was also more broadly interested in, is it always the case that the causality goes in in 1 direction, or is it actually kind of like quite multiscale or bidirectional?…
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