Ben Gilbert: evaluation

Transcript context

…That’s why it’s a little irritating to me. They say you’ve been running it. Since I was running J.P. Morgan, I was running 40% of the company for the whole time. When I got to Bank one, and I’m not working around the clock, I already knew that a logical strategic merger might be J.P. Morgan. I know all these companies. That’s the other thing about fortress balance sheet is you also have real strategies that survive the test of time. You’re not flipping and flopping. Then I’m sitting there and of course the tape comes, J.P. Morgan Chase to merge. We’re worth $25 billion. They’re now worth like $80 or $90 billion or whatever the number was. I’m like, well, there goes that dream. Four years later, our stock was up to doubled or something like that. Theirs actually come in and it was in the target range. I had been meeting with Bill Harris and the current chairman of J.P. Morgan at the time. We were talking about it. We both knew it made business sense. They were looking for a CEO. We had been talking probably for a year-and-a-half before that. They’re looking for a CEO. Did they give Bank One shareholders 42% because they were looking for a CEO? There were two lawsuits. We got the premium, they got the name and location. I effectively had control from day one because inside the merge agreement—this is almost unheard of—when we get the premium, is to not have me become CEO 18 months later, 75% of the board would have to vote me out. The board was eight Bank One people and eight J.P. Morgan people. I knew a lot of the J.P. Morgan board members too, who respected me. Bill Harris and I were very close, but that was the agreement. They got sued for paying too much to buy me. I got sued for not taking enough. You get sued, you can’t win in these.…

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