Speaker unverified: evaluation

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…dge now it's a being. Like, how are we going to define being? Now what? Like, what's the implication of having determined this thing as a being? So if it's a being, it has subjective experiences. And. If it has subjective experiences, there's some content in those experiences that we care about to varying degrees. Like I care about the content of other humans' experiences quite a bit. I care about the content of like a dog's experience is some, not as much as a person, but less, but less, but some. I hear about some humans' experiences way more, like my son or whatever, because I'm closer to him and more connected. And so I would really want to know at that point, well, what is the content of this thing's experience? So how do you determine that? If I'm asking you now, you've got a being now that has experience. Like, what is your, how do you determine that? Like, how do you feel about? of this thing's experience? So how do you determine that? If I'm asking you now, you've got a being now that has experience. Like, what is your, how do you determine that? Like, how do you feel about? Oh, how do you, oh yeah, okay, so. Does it have more rights than, you know, the way you understand the content of something's experiences is that you look at effectively the goal states it revisits, because, and so you do is you take a temporal course screening of its entire action observation trajectory. This is like in theory, this is you do this subconsciously, but this is what your brain is doing. And you look for revisited states at across in theory, every spatial and temporal course screening possible. Now you have to have an inductive bias because there's too many of those. But like you go searching for, okay, it is in a home, these homeostatic loops. Every homeostatic loop is effectively a belief in its belief space. This is a, if you've promised the free energy principle, active inference, Carl Friston, this is effective what the free energy principle says, is that if you have a thing that is persistent and its existence depends on its own actions, which generally it would for an AI, because if it does the wrong thing, it goes away. We turn it off. And so then that licenses a view of it as having the beliefs, and that specifically the beliefs are inferred as being the homeostatic revisited states that it is in the loop for, and that the change in those states is it's learning. And To be a moral being I cared about, what I'd want to see is a multi-stier hierarchy of these. Because if you have a single level, it's not self-referential. And like basically you have states, but you can't have pain or pleasure really in a meaningful sense. Because like, yes, it is hot. Is it too hot? Do I like it if it's too hot? Like, I don't know. So you have to have at least a model of a model in order to have it be too hot. And you really have to have a model of a model of a model to meaningfully have pain and pleasure because sure, it's hotter than I, it's too hot in the sense that I want to move back this way, but like, is it, it's always a little bit too hot or a little bit too cold. Is it too, hot? The second derivative is actually the place where you get pain and pleasure. So I'd want to see if it has homeostatic, second order homeostatic dynamics in its goal states. And then that would convince me it has at least pleasure and pain. So it's at least like an animal and I would start to accredit it at least some amount of care. Third order dynamics, you can't actually just pop up for a third order dynamic. It doesn't work that way. But you can have a model of the, you have to then take the chunk of all the states over time and look at the distribution over time. And that gives you a new first order of behaviors of states. And that new first order of states tells you basically, if that is meaningfully there, that tells you that it has I guess you'd call it like feelings, almost like it has, it has ways, it has, it has meta states, a set of meta states that it alternates between, that it shifts between. e, that tells you that it has I guess you'd call it like feelings, almost like it has, it has ways, it has, it has meta states, a set of meta states that it alternates between, that it shifts between. And then if you climb all the way up of, up that, and you should have have, okay, well, then you have, you have a, you have trajectories between, between these meta states, and then a second, second order of those, that's like thought. That's like, now it's like a person. And so if I found all six of those layers, which by the way, I definitely don't think you'd find it in LLM. Like, in fact, I know you can't find them because these things don't have attention spans like that at all. Then I would start to at least very seriously consider it as a, you know, a thinking being like somewhat like a human. There's a third order you could go up as well, but like that's basically what I'd be interested in is like the underlying dynamics of its learning processes and how its goal states shift over time. I think that's what basically tells you if it has internal pleasure pain states and sort of like self-reflective moral desires and things like that. And zooming out, this moral question is obviously very interesting, but if someone wasn't interested in the moral question as much, I think what you would say is if I understand correctly, is you also just feel on purely pragmatically your approach is going to be more effective in aligning AIs than some of these, you know, tops down control methods that we alluded to as well, right?…

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