Speaker unverified: belief

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…think you need more than just it acts exactly as behaviourally indistinguishable. Like it's not a sufficient bar. Wait, how would you, what else can you know about something apart from its behaviours? I mean, a lot, like the, again, if you, how would you? No, I'm sorry. I mean, can you name it? I'm not a behaviour. Yeah, I think there's like far more kind of, experimental evidence you can have with kind of, no. Just any object and a thing I could know about it that is not from its behavior. I'm not, yeah, I'm not sure I get the question, I suppose, but equally. It's not like it's a dumb, straightforward question, but like I'm claiming you only know things because they have behaviors that you observe, and you're saying no, you can know something about something without without Observing its behaviors. No, OK, great. Tell me about this. Tell me about this thing and this behavior and this thing I can know about it that is not due to its behaviors. I guess I'm saying there's different levels of observation. And just simply a duck, you know, something quacking like a duck or something does not guarantee that it's actually a duck. Like I would have to like also cut it and reel it and see if there's, you know, if it's duck-like on the inside. So just the outside is sufficient. I guess, I totally, one of its behaviors is like the way that the, floats move around in the map moles, right? one of the things I would want to go look for, which you could totally do, is I want to go look in the manifold of its, the belief manifold, and I want to go see if that belief manifolds encodes a sub-manifold that is self-referential and a sub-sub-manifold that is the dynamics of the self-referential manifold, which is mind. And I would want to know, does this seem well-described internally as that kind of a system, or does it look like a big lookup table? That would matter to me. That's part of its behaviors that I would care about. I would also care about how it acts. And you know, and you wait all the evidence together, and then you try to guess, does this thing look like it's a thing that has feelings and, goals and cares about stuff in net on balance or not. Like, but I can't imagine like, which I think you could do for an, I think we do for the AIs. I think we're always doing that, right? And so I'm trying to figure out like, beyond that, what else is there? That just seems like the thing. Yeah, it seems like you guys are using behavior in slightly different sense and Emmett is using behavior also in the context of what it's made of the inside. No, behavior is what I can observe of it. I don't actually know what it's made of. I can only, I can cut your brain open, I can see you, I can observe you neuroning and glistening. Your neurons glistening, but I don't actually ever, you can't get inside of it, right? That's the subjective, that's the, that's the part, it's not the surfaces. Before the reason I brought this up is because you were basically about to make this argument of, hey, you see it as a tool, not necessarily as a being. Can you kind of finish with the point? Do you remember the point you were making? p is because you were basically about to make this argument of, hey, you see it as a tool, not necessarily as a being. Can you kind of finish with the point? Do you remember the point you were making? I suppose that, yeah, I think that given how I understand these systems, I think there's no contradiction in thinking that an AGI can remain a tool, an ASI can remain a tool, and that this has implications about how to use it and your implications around things like care, about whether you can get it to work 24-7 or something. there's this. So I can totally see, I guess I conceptualize them more as almost like extensions of human agency recognition in some sense, more so than a separate being or a separate thing that we need to now cohabitate with. And I think that second or latter frame ends, you know, if you kind of just fall forward, you end up as like, well, how do you cohabit with the thing? And then is it like an alien-like? And so, and I think That's the wrong frame. It's kind of almost a category error in some sense. I got to my first question then. What evidence, what concrete evidence would you look at? What observations could you make that would change your mind? Sure, I mean, I have to think about that. I don't have a clear answer here, but I mean. I got to tell you, man, if you want to go around making claims that something else isn't of being worthy of moral respect, you should have an answer to the question, what observations would change your mind? If it has if it has outwardly moral agency looking behaviors that could be, make it mean immoral agent, but you don't know, and reasonable, smart other people disagree with you, I would really put forward that it's that question, what would change your mind, should be a burning question, because what if you're wrong? But what if you're wrong? I mean, the moral disaster is like pretty big. No, I'm saying you are, you could be, you could be right. The false positives, false negatives have costs on both ends. It's not some sort of like, you know, precautionary principle for everything. And like, unless I can disprove it, I need to now like... I have the same question for me. You could reasonably ask me, Emmett, you think it's going to be a being. What would change your mind? I have an answer for that question, too. And if you want, I'm happy to talk about what I think are the relevant observations that tell you whether or not, that would cause me to shift my opinion from where it's criminal thing, which is that more general intelligences are going to be beings. What's the implication now? I mean, it's one thing, let's say just I acknowledge now it's a being. Like, how are we going to define being? Now what? Like, what's the implication of having determined this thing as a being? So if it's a being, it has subjective experiences. And. dge now it's a being. Like, how are we going to define being? Now what? Like, what's the implication of having determined this thing as a being? So if it's a being, it has subjective experiences. And. If it has subjective experiences, there's some content in those experiences that we care about to varying degrees. Like I care about the content of other humans' experiences quite a bit. I care about the content of like a dog's experience is some, not as much as a person, but less, but less, but some. I hear about some humans' experiences way more, like my son or whatever, because I'm closer to him and more connected. And so I would really want to know at that point, well, what is the content of this thing's experience? So how do you determine that? If I'm asking you now, you've got a being now that has experience. Like, what is your, how do you determine that? Like, how do you feel about?…

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