Jennifer Burns: evaluation

Transcript context

…u had to register. You couldn’t invest. Where all these rules and strictures and the falling of Bretton Woods really blows that all open. It’s a precursor to globalization, so Friedman is right there. Now, he’s very ambivalent about Nixon. He sees that Nixon is not an honest person. He thinks he’s very intelligent, and Nixon’s dream is to create a new centrist majority. So, he does many things to go back on his supposed economic principles and ideals. So Friedman does not like this. He doesn’t like the price controls. He’s in communication with his old mentor, Arthur Burns, who’s now the Chair of the Federal Reserve. And Burns is basically doing everything wrong in monetary policy. And I describe this in the book in some detail, these anguished letters back and forth, and basically, as I see it, Burns doesn’t have a solid theory of inflation, and the more Friedman pushes him, it’s almost like Burns is willfully ignoring Friedman and doing the opposite of what Friedman says, so Burns is running a very loose monetary policy. Inflation is quite considerable over the ’70s. We were all spooked by… What did it get to? 6%, something like that. Recently for a very short time, this is inflation going over 10%, hovering at 8% for basically the whole decade of the ’70s, going up and down but with extremely elevated rates. And so, the Carter presidency largely follows foreign policies. A big part of… The Carter presidency largely falls. Foreign policy is a big part of it, but the failure to tame inflation is part of it. And then Reagan comes in, and now Reagan loves Friedman and Friedman loves Reagan, very mutual feeling. The Reagan administration creates an advisory economic board. Friedman’s on it. He’s retired now. He’s entering golden years, but he really has Reagan’s ear. And here what he does is he convinces Reagan of his theory of inflation, which is inflation has been caused. It’s a monetary phenomenon that has been caused by bad monetary policy. Inflation has an accelerating dynamic. The only way to end inflation is by really showing and signaling that government policy has changed. And when you do that, it’s very painful for a short amount of time, people will suffer, but then you will come out on the other side into stable prices, and this is what you need for economic prosperity. when you do that, it’s very painful for a short amount of time, people will suffer, but then you will come out on the other side into stable prices, and this is what you need for economic prosperity. So the man who implements this policy, Paul Volcker, he’s definitely influenced by Friedman, buys the big picture of Friedman. He even buys Friedman’s specific technique of the monetary growth rule and of the focus on monetary aggregates, which Friedman has said, “Money matters, aggregates matter, and that’s what money is. ” Pretty quickly Volcker finds that because of inflation and the financial deregulation in response to it, the aggregates don’t work the way Friedman said they would. And so the specific policy Friedman recommends, Volcker tries it for a year or so, doesn’t work super well. But what does work is letting interest rates go high, go above inflation, to a point where both the general citizenry and the financial markets believe like, oh, they’re actually serious about inflation. And because we’ve had a decade of inflation with all these presidents saying, Ford, “We’re going to whip inflation now,” that monetary policy has lost credibility. This is why people focus so much on credibility today, because once it’s lost, it’s really hard to get it back. And one way Volcker gets it back is interest rates over 20%. Unemployment very high, as high as 25% in construction sectors. And as this is happening, Milton Friedman is whispering in Reagan’s ear, “This is the right thing. Stay the course. This is going to work.” Now, interestingly, he hates Volcker or Volcker hates him, and Friedman will never give Volcker credit for this policy, but he will give Reagan credit for this policy. But he owes credit himself for keeping Reagan from wobbling on this policy and just pushing it through. And he also tells Reagan, very pragmatically, “You better do this now. You’ve got a four-year term. Do this in the first two years of your term. Things will have turned around by 1984 when you run for reelection and you’ll benefit from it.” And that’s absolutely what happens. If we could take a small tangent, a question I have to ask about, since we mentioned Bretton Woods and maybe the gold standard, maybe just have a general discussion about this whole space of ideas, there’s a lot of people today that care about cryptocurrency. What do you think that Milton Friedman would say about cryptocurrency and what role crypto might play in the economy, whether he would be for this idea against this idea, and if we could look at it for today, and also just 10, 100 years from now?…

Stored transcript either side of the excerpt. The highlighted words are the published quote; the surrounding text is unedited source, never generated.