David Deutsch: evaluation

Transcript context

…Okay, so I want to ask you a question about Bayesianism versus Praetorianism. So one reason why people prefer Bayes is because there seems to be a way of describing changes in epistemic status when the relative status of a theory hasn't changed. So I'll give you an example. Currently, the Many Worlds explanation is the best way to explain quantum mechanics. Right? But suppose in the future, we were able to build an AGI on a quantum computer and were able to design some clever interference experiment, as you suggest to have it be able to report back being in a superposition across many worlds. Now, it seems that even though many worlds remain the best, the only explanation somehow is that its epistemic status has changed as a result of the experiment. In terms of the Bayesian theory, you can say the credibility of this theory has increased. So how would you describe these sorts of changes in Praetorian view? So what has happened is that at the moment, we have only one explanation that can't be immediately knocked down. If we did that thought experiment, we might well decide that this will provide the ammunition to knock down ideas for alternative explanations that have not been thought of yet. Obviously, it wouldn't be enough to knock down every possible explanation, because for a start, we know that quantum theory is false. We don't know for sure that the next theory will have many worlds in it. It will, but we can't prove anything like that. But I would replace the idea of increased credence with a theory that the experiment will provide a quiver full of arrows or a repertoire of arguments that goes beyond the known bad arguments andwill reach into other types of arguments. The reason I would say that is that some of the existing misconceptions about quantum theory reside in misconceptions about the methodology of science. Now I've written the paper about what it's the right methodology of science where that doesn't apply. But many physicists and many philosophers would disagree with that. And they would advocate a methodology of science that's more based on empiricism. Of course, that empiricism is at stake and can be knocked down in some terms. But not everybody thinks that. Now, once we have an experiment, such as my thought experiment, if that was actually done, then people could not use their arguments based on a fallacious idea of empiricism, because their theory would have been refuted, even by the standards of empiricism, which shouldn't have been needed in the first place. But, so that's why that's the way I would express that the repertoire of arguments will become more powerful if that experiment were done successfully. The next question I have is, how far do you take the principle that open ended scientific progress is the best way to deal with existential dangers. To give one example, you have something like data function research, right. And it's conceivable that it could lead to more knowledge and how to stop dangerous pathogens. But at least in Bayesian terms, you could say it seems even more likely that it can or has led to the spread of a manmade pathogen that would have not otherwise been naturally developed. So would your belief in open scientific Progress allow us to say, “Okay, let's stop doing some research?”…

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