Lex Fridman: belief

Transcript context

…This is why I like the story of Cain and Abel, I would say. Because Cain is mediocre, but that’s because he refuses to do his best. It’s not something intrinsic to him. And I actually think that’s the right formulation because I had people in my clinical practice who were, they were lost in many dimensions from the perspective of comparison. One woman I remember in particular who, man, she had a lot to contend with, she was not educated, she was not intelligent. She had a brutal family, terrible history of psychiatric hospitalization. And when I met her at a hospital, she was an outpatient from the psychiatric ward, and she had been in there with people that she thought were worse off than her, and they were. And that was a long way down. That was like Dante’s Inferno level down. It was a long-term, psychiatric inpatient ward. Some of the people had been there for 30 years. It made One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest look like a romantic comedy. And she had come back to see if she could take some of those people for a walk, and was trying to find out how to get permission to do it. Better than other people. Some people are more intelligent, some people are more beautiful, some people are more athletic. Maybe it’s possible for everyone at all levels of attainment to strive towards the good. And maybe those talents that are given to people unfairly don’t privilege them in relationship to their moral conduct. And I think that’s true. There’s no evidence, for example, that there’s any correlation whatsoever between intelligence and morality. You’re not better because you’re smart. And what that also implies is if you’re smart, you can be a lot better at being worse. I think, for myself, I’m just afraid of dismissing people because of my perception of them. Yeah. Well, that’s why we have that metaphysical presumption that everybody’s made in the image of God. Despite that immense diversity of apparent ability, there’s that underlying metaphysical assumption that, yeah, we all vary in our perceived and actual utility in relationship to any proximal goal, but all of that’s independent of the question of axiomatic worth. And preposterous as that notion appears to be, it seems to me that societies that accept it as a fundamental axiomatic presumption are always the societies that you’d want to live in if you had a choice. And that to me is an existence proof for the utility of the presumption. And also, if you treat people like that in your life, every encounter you have, you make the assumption that it’s a radical equality of worth despite individual variance in ability, something like that, man, your interactions go way better. I mean, everyone wants to be treated that way. Look, here’s a developmental sequence for you, naive and trusting, hurt and cynical. Okay, well, is hurt and cynical better than naive and trusting? It’s like, yeah, probably. Is that where it ends? How about cynical and trusting as step three? And then the trust becomes courage. It’s like, yeah, I’ll put my hand out for you, but it’s not because I’m a fool. And I think that’s right, because that’s the re-instantiation of that initial trust that makes childhood magical and paradisal. But it’s the admixture of that with wisdom. It’s like, yeah, we could walk together uphill, but that doesn’t mean, and I’ll presume that that’s your aim, but that doesn’t mean that I’m not going to watch.…

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