Lex Fridman: uncertainty

Transcript context

…In us, but free will’s totally consistent with that. I don’t know what I think about that. That’s complicated to imagine. Just that little bit of randomness is enough. Okay. Well, it’s not just the randomness. There’s two features. One is the randomness helps generate some novelty and some flexibility, but it’s also that because you’re the structure that’s deep in time, you have this commonatorial history that’s you. And I think about time and assembly theory, not as linear time, but as commonatorial time. So if you have all of the structure that you’re built out of, in principle, your future can be combinations of that structure. You obviously need to persist yourself as a coherent you. So you want to optimize for a future in that combinatorial space that still includes you, most of the time for most of us. And then that gives you a space to operate in, and that’s your horizon where your free will can operate, and your free will can’t be instantaneous. So for example, I’m sitting here talking to you right now. I can’t be in the UK and I can’t be in Arizona, but I could plan, I could execute my free will over time because free will is a temporal feature of life, to be there tomorrow or the next day if I wanted to.…

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