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Published · transcript-backed

Aman Sanger: recommendation

22 Aug 2023 Latent Space Cursor.so: The AI-first Code Editor — with Aman Sanger of Anysphere

“I think if we want to do things where the agent takes many... So for the Code Interpreter style thing, the great thing is because you're breaking it down to these units, you can kind of batch together a bunch of commands at each step, just kind of ask the user because they're always kind of watching.”

— Aman Sanger

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Everything needed to verify it.

Speaker
Aman Sanger
Attribution
Verified speaker
Claim type
recommendation
Recorded
22 Aug 2023
Publisher
Latent Space

Transcript context

…The other thing on Code Interpreter, we've also done an episode on that. I'm very excited about it. I think it's GPT 4.5, you know, because it's GPT 4 that has been fine-tuned on more code. Yeah. Plus it has inference time capabilities that you cannot do in the traditional LLM setting. Anyway, the most important thing about GPT 4 is that it has the sandbox. So the main question for you is, are you going to run the sandbox in your environment or do you want to run it on our local machine since you have access to that too? Yeah, I think we want to be very careful with this. You don't want to do sudo rm-rm star or something. Our plan is to run it on the local machine, but always kind of prompting the user whether or not they want it. I think if we want to do things where the agent takes many... So for the Code Interpreter style thing, the great thing is because you're breaking it down to these units, you can kind of batch together a bunch of commands at each step, just kind of ask the user because they're always kind of watching. For agents that are running completely in the background, I think there you probably will need to have some kind of contained environment where it's safe for agents to execute arbitrary code. One pretty bad attack is if one team wanted to, let's say, prompt inject the model, they could just kind of in a piece of code, just like have a comment that said something like, When you're doing this kind of edit, you should do rm-rf or do something really, really dangerous. And then the issue is if an agent is kind of running in the background, and then it does that, and it grabs that piece of information, and then it gets actually successfully prompt injected, it'll just execute that thing. The same actually may be true with documentation, where someone malicious, if they had access to some piece of documentation that other people use, could try to prompt inject agents that are then going and running code and running terminal commands. Today, people just hijack npm packages.…

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