Speaker unverified: belief

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…hat is the formal position- I don’t even know if that’s true today because there may be- And what is the formal position of this Israeli government? No, no. I’m saying I don’t know if it exists today. Okay, its predecessor and its predecessor and its predecessor. I’m talking about [inaudible 04:05:13]. Professor Morris. Professor Morris. Come on. That’s what Israelis want. Professor Morris. They want a change of psyche among the Palestinians. Mouin has an interesting- If that doesn’t happen, there won’t be a Palestinian state. There just won’t be. Mouin has an interesting point. Forget international law and all the UN resolutions. I know you want to forget it just like you want to forget the genocide charge. I know you want to forget that. Well, the Palestinians want to forget it too when it doesn’t suit them as well, right? But here’s the problem, and it’s exactly the problem that Mouin just brought up. Now, I read carefully your book, One State, Two States. With all due respect, absolutely a disgrace. Coming from you, coming from you- Most reviewers didn’t agree with you, though. Yeah. Coming from you, it was like you wrote it in your sleep. It’s nothing compared to what you wrote before. I don’t know why you did it. In my opinion, you ruined your reputation, not totally, but you undermined it with that book. But let’s get to the issue that Mouin wrote. Here’s what you said. You said, formally… You said, “Yes, it’s true, the Palestinians recognize Israel.” But then you said, “Viscerally, in their hearts-“ They don’t. “… they didn’t really recognize Israel.” So I thought to myself, “How does Professor Morris know-“ Cut open your chest. “… what’s in the hearts of Palestinians? I don’t know.” [inaudible 04:06:34]. I was surprised, as a historian, you would be talking about what’s lurking in the hearts of Palestinians. But then you said something which was really interesting. You said, “Even if, in their hearts, they accepted Israel,” you said, quote, “Rationally, they could never accept Israel because they got nothing. They had this beautiful Palestine and now they’re reduced to just a few parcels of land. The two-state settlement-“ So they will never accept it. Yes. Which is true. So you said there’s no way they can accept it. No, I would say that as well. Yeah. The two-state solution, as proposed, doesn’t make any sense. Exactly as Mouin said, you keep moving the goalposts until we reach the point where we realize, according to Benny Morris, there can’t be a solution. So why don’t you just say that outright? Why don’t you say it outright? According to you, the Palestinians can never be reasonable because according to you- They want all of Palestine. That’s why. According to you, they couldn’t possibly agree to a two-state settlement because it’s such a lousy settlement. That’s what you say. Because they want all of Palestine. But you said, rationally, they couldn’t accept it, not their feelings. It’s both. You said rational. You went from formally, viscerally, rationally. So now we’re reaching the point where, according to Benny Morris, the Palestinians can’t be reasonable because, reasonably, they have to reject two states. went from formally, viscerally, rationally. So now we’re reaching the point where, according to Benny Morris, the Palestinians can’t be reasonable because, reasonably, they have to reject two states. They want all of Palestine. So, Mouin is absolutely correct. There’s no way to resolve the problem, according to your logic. They want all of Palestine. He said that himself. He said they should dismantle Israel. I’m talking about- That’s what he’s saying. What I said- He didn’t say that. Dismantle Israel. What I said, and I’ve written- I’m glad you didn’t deny it. Go ahead. I’ve written extensively on this issue, on why a two-state settlement is still feasible, and I came out in support of that proposition. Perhaps in my heart, you can see that I was just bullshitting, but that’s what I actually wrote. That was a number of years ago. And just as a matter of historical record, beginning in the early 1970s, there was fierce debate within the Palestinian national movement about whether to accept or reject. And there were three schools of thought. There was one that would accept nothing less than the total liberation of Palestine. There was a second that accepted what was called the establishment of a fighting national authority on Palestinian soil, which they saw- As a springboard. … as a springboard for the total liberation of Palestine. And there was a third school that believed that, under current dynamics and so on, that they should go for a two-state settlement. And our friend and correspondent [inaudible 04:09:41] has written a very perceptive article on when the PLO, already in 1976, came out in open support of a two-state resolution at the Security Council. PLO accepted it. Israel, of course, rejected it. But the resolution didn’t pass because the US and the UK vetoed it. It was both of them. I think it was nine to five [inaudible 04:10:06]. Ah, okay. Yeah. But fact of the matter is that the PLO came to accept a two-state settlement. Why they did it I think is irrelevant. And subsequently, the PLO acted on the basis of seeking to achieve a two-state settlement. The reason, I think, and I think Norm, you’ve written about this, the reason that Arafat was so insistent on getting minimally acceptable terms for a two-state settlement at Camp David and afterwards was precisely because he knew that once he signed, that was all the Palestinians were going to get. If his intention had been, “I’m not accepting Israel. I simply want to springboard,” he would’ve accepted a Palestinian state in Jericho, but he didn’t. He insisted- That’s something I’ve never understood. He should have logically accepted the springboard, and then from there, launched his next stage. No, he understood what you don’t understand. He should’ve done that. He understood international law would put a real constraint on him once he accepted it was over. No, but also, I think, constitutionally, he was incapable of signing. I don’t know that. You’re right that he should have- I’m not his [inaudible 04:11:21]. … accepted it. But if you’re correct, okay, that he was really out to- [inaudible 04:11:26]. ncapable of signing. I don’t know that. You’re right that he should have- I’m not his [inaudible 04:11:21]. … accepted it. But if you’re correct, okay, that he was really out to- [inaudible 04:11:26]. … eliminate Israel, then he wouldn’t have cared about the borders. He wouldn’t have cared about what the thing said about refugees. He would’ve gotten a sovereign state and used that to achieve that purpose. The springboard. But I think it was precisely because he recognized that he was not negotiating for a springboard, he was negotiating permanent status, that he was such a stickler about the details. Just as a factual matter, he wasn’t such a stickler. When they asked him how many refugees, the numbers at the- It was the principle rather than the numbers. It was the principle. He said they would be pragmatic about it. [inaudible 04:12:00]. Yes. And the numbers that were used at Annapolis were between 100 and 250,000 refugees over 10 years. That was the number. Arafat, when he was asked at Camp David, he kept saying, “I care about the Lebanese… the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon,” which came to about 300,000. Those were his priority. Which was a large concession from… whether you accept the number or not, that he wasn’t talking about 6 million. He was talking about between 100 and 250,000 over 10 years. Now, the best offer that came from the Palestinians… Excuse me, the best offer that came from Israel was the Olmert offer.…

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