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Paul Christiano: evaluation

31 Oct 2023 Dwarkesh Podcast Paul Christiano — Preventing an AI takeover

“You say like, look, a matter of policy sort of access to industry is somewhat restricted or somewhat regulated, even though, again, right now it can be mostly regulated just because most people aren't rich enough that they could even go off and just build 1000 tanks.”

— Paul Christiano

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Speaker
Paul Christiano
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Verified speaker
Claim type
evaluation
Recorded
31 Oct 2023
Publisher
Dwarkesh Podcast

Transcript context

…Okay, so then let's talk about the transition period in which we were doing all this thinking. What should that period look like? Because you can't have the scenario where everybody has access to the most advanced capabilities and can kill off all the humans with a new bioweapon at the same time. I guess you wouldn't want too much concentration. You wouldn't want just one agent having AI this entire time. So what is the arrangement of this period of reflection that you'd be happy with? Yeah, I guess there's two aspects of that that seem particularly challenging, or there's a bunch of aspects that are challenging. All of these are things that I personally like. I just think about my one little slice of this problem in my day job. So here I am speculating. Yeah, but so one question is what kind of access to AI is both compatible with the kinds of improvements you'd like? So do you want a lot of people to be able to use AI to better understand what's true or relieve material suffering, things like this, and also compatible with not all killing each other immediately? I think sort of the default or the simplest option there is to say there are certain kinds of technology or certain kinds of action where destruction is easier than defense. So, for example, in the world of today, it seems like maybe this is true with physical explosives, maybe this is true with biological weapons, maybe this true with just getting a gun and shooting people. There's a lot of ways in which it's just kind of easy to cause a lot of harm and there's not very good protective measures. So I think the easiest path would say we're going to think about those. We're going to think about particular ways in which destruction is easy and try and either control access to the kinds of physical resources that are needed to cause that harm. So, for example, you can imagine the world where an individual actually just can't, even though they're rich enough to can't control their own factory, that can make tanks. You say like, look, a matter of policy sort of access to industry is somewhat restricted or somewhat regulated, even though, again, right now it can be mostly regulated just because most people aren't rich enough that they could even go off and just build 1000 tanks. You live in the future where people actually are so rich, you need to say that's just not a thing you're allowed to do, which to a significant extent is already true. And you can expand the range of domains where that's true. And then you could also hope to intervene on actual provision of information. Or if people are using their AI, you might say, look, we care about what kinds of interactions with AI, what kind of information people are getting from AI. So even if for the most part, people are pretty free to use AI to delegate tasks to AI agents, to consult AI advisors, we still have some legal limitations on how people use AI. So again, don't ask your AI how to cause terrible damage. I think some of these are kind of easy. So in the case of don't ask your AI how you could murder a million people, it's not such a hard legal requirement. I think some things are a lot more subtle and messy, like a lot of domains. If you were talking about influencing people or running misinformation campaigns or whatever, then I think you get into a much messier line between the kinds of things people want to do and the kinds of things you might be uncomfortable with them doing. ng misinformation campaigns or whatever, then I think you get into a much messier line between the kinds of things people want to do and the kinds of things you might be uncomfortable with them doing. Probably, I think most about persuasion as a thing, like in that messy line where there's ways in which it may just be rough or the world may be kind of messy. If you have a bunch of people trying to live their lives interacting with other humans who have really good AI. Advisors helping them run persuasion campaigns or whatever. But anyway, I think for the most part the default remedy is think about particular harms, have legal protections either in the use of physical technologies that are relevant or in access to AI advice or whatever else to protect against those harms. And that regime won't work forever. At some point, the set of harms grows and the set of unanticipated harms grows. But I think that regime might last like a very long time.…

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