Evidence receipt / evaluation
Published · transcript-backedDwarkesh Patel: evaluation
31 Oct 2023 Dwarkesh Podcast Paul Christiano — Preventing an AI takeover
“Correct me if this is wrong, but it sounds like you basically give it the opportunity to do a coup or make a bioweapon or whatever in testing in a situation where it thinks it’s the real world and you’re like, it didn’t do any of that.”
Source trail
Everything needed to verify it.
- Speaker
- Dwarkesh Patel
- Attribution
- Verified speaker
- Claim type
- evaluation
- Recorded
- 31 Oct 2023
- Publisher
- Dwarkesh Podcast
Transcript context
…So, again, there’s sort of like some stuff you care about on the Mississippi side and some stuff you care about on the misalignment side. And there’s probably further things you care about especially to extend your concerns regarding catastrophic risk. But maybe I most want to talk about just like what you care about on the alignment side, because it’s like the thing I’ve actually thought about most and also a thing I care about a lot. Also, I think a significant fraction of the existential risk over the kind of foreseeable future. So on that front, I broadly think there’s like two kinds. Like, if you ask me right now what evidence for alignment could make you comfortable, I think my best guess would be to provide two kinds of evidence. So one kind of evidence is on the like, could you detect or prevent catastrophic harm if such a system was misaligned? I think there’s like a couple of things you would do here. One thing you would do is on this adversarial evaluation front. So you could try and say, for example, we have tried to test our system in a broad diversity of situations that reflect cases where it might cause harm, like cases where someone is trying to recruit it to, like anyway. Cases where it might cause harm or cases where a large number of AI systems might sort of all decide to work across purposes to humans. Like the robot rebellion is starting or whatever. We’ve done evaluation in a broad distribution of situations, and then we have tried to argue that our AI is actually like, those tests are indicative of the real world. So we’ve tried to argue like, hey, actually the AI is not very good at distinguishing situations we produce in the lab as tests from similar situations that occur in the real world. And the coverage of this distribution is reasonable. This is an example of a thing you can do that’s not really making assumptions about what’s going on inside the model or about how the model is the model aligned. It’s more trying to say, is it the case that our testing or monitoring machinery could detect or react to something bad happening? In this case, could it detect a system which would, under some conditions do something really bad? There’s a lot of stuff in that genre, and I tried to throw out that example, but I think there’s like a big like that on its own wouldn’t be compelling even from this perspective. You kind of need a lot of pieces together and that’s like kind of a demanding technical project. But I think one without necessarily like, deep conceptual difficulty. A big problem with it is it’s liable to fail. Like it’s liable you’re going to do that testing and say, we think these tests are representative because the AI can’t distinguish tests from the real world, which you can maybe achieve now, but will probably become impossible to achieve at some level. It’s not clear what’s at human level or how far past human level. Let’s just make that example concrete for the audience. Correct me if this is wrong, but it sounds like you basically give it the opportunity to do a coup or make a bioweapon or whatever in testing in a situation where it thinks it’s the real world and you’re like, it didn’t do any of that. Is that what you’re talking about? That’s the kind of thing okay. And it’s not the greatest so dag color when I say I can’t tell the difference. The kind of valuation you would love to do if you could is to say like, hey, we have a bunch of real world deployment. We have a bunch of data from those deployments. We also have a bunch of in the lab tests of situations. If we look at in the lab test of a situation together with real world cases in which the situation occurs, and then we fine tune a model to try and distinguish the difference there the model can’t even tell when fine tuned the difference between test and real world cases. And if the model can tell the difference, which is almost certainly going to be the case at some level capability, then you say, okay, our first line of hoped for defense has failed. And so now we need to understand how can tests be indicative when models are capable enough to tell the difference between the tests and the real world. Now you need to start arguing about what is the model paying attention to. It gets basically like a first line of if you get lucky, what would work here? And then there’s a deeper like, you probably have to do novel science at some point to make this case. All of this was part of like I was saying, maybe you want to have kind of two lines of defense. All of this was like part of this first line of defense of, like, can you detect something is going wrong or can you prevent harm from occurring? Can you have monitoring that will react quickly enough to avoid catastrophe? I think you probably also want to have a second line of defense that’s more maybe this is even more important than the first one, is just understanding whether dangerous forms of misalignment can occur. The best reference point for this, I think, is the like, there have been a couple of projects like this in academia. Anthropic has been working on a project or spun up a team doing this kind of work, trying to say, like, can dangerous forms of reward hacking occur or can deceptive alignment, in fact occur in the lab? And here what you want to do is either say, like, okay, even if we create a best case, even if you create optimal conditions for deceptive alignment or for reward hacking, we just can’t cause it to occur even in the lab. And if you do a good enough job of that, I think it could give you some evidence, and again, more likely that fails in that when you create optimal conditions, you do see deceptive alignment and reward hacking in the lab. But then once you have that data, once you can say, okay, in the lab, actually these things can occur, then you can start saying, and we have a robust scientific understanding that enables us to fix those problems when they occur. Or then you have this fork on your second line where you say, either it is very hard, or we’re not able to create conditions where these failures emerge. Or I think more likely we are able to create those conditions.…
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