Adam Gleave: belief

Transcript context

…I'm optimistic that we can do a lot better than we have now, and I think it it's great that, for example, president Trump and Xi Jinping are are talking and seem to have quite productive conversations. So I think the question is how far can we get? I think it's clear that we need to at least try to work with with China and other countries on some of this. America cannot solve this problem on its own. I'm focus of AI security leaderboard. We're getting to a point where if the best proprietary safeguards were used across the board at American companies, but not yet, but we're getting there, then most of them misusers would probably shift to open weight models with and for most people, open weight models are developed in China. So I think we've just got to work with China there or at least Chinese developers if we want to address that. And this is something that there's just common interest. Neither nation wants random terrorists going going around building explosive devices or or bioweapons. So I think there's some low hanging fruit there. And part of this is just a a lack of understanding. So safety only really is just beginning to enter the mainstream consciousness in The US. And China's just a bit further behind on on that. But that that is changing, and I've had a number of excellent conversations with scientists based in China who who are doing great work and working on these issues. So I think that that that's a great starting point, but we all need to have that kind of scientific agreement ultimately flow into corporate and political will. I think where I'm more skeptical is really being able to coordinate to avoid kind of some kind of race dynamic. I think that the race is a little bit overrated. I'd say it's much more of a China was trying not to be left behind. The The US and a lot of what they've doing has been copying, whether it's directly distilling US frontier models or just realizing, oh, The US is making AI a priority. So we better as well. So from that perspective, I think that The US is in a good position, but if it takes the it's better for accelerator. China probably will a bit. But the flip side is if The US just slams on the brakes, China might decide, we'll just keep coasting, and we'll at least catch up, and maybe we'll go past. So I think some kind of coordinated development where we agree to common safety standards through mutual market access or just it doesn't even have to be identical safety standards, but just both countries implement some good best practices. And there's some tacit agreement that if either country starts some sort of secret project of other detects, then that that's gonna be that's gonna be bad. There's gonna be repercussions, and we try and have broadly the same safety standards. That feels pretty doable to me, but actually being able say, no, we're we're both gonna gonna stop at this point until some research advance is made. That that's gonna require a lot more political work than it is now. doable to me, but actually being able say, no, we're we're both gonna gonna stop at this point until some research advance is made. That that's gonna require a lot more political work than it is now. It feels very unstable. It's not just about The US and China. Other countries can also be relevant if we're talking about more than a year of delay. So I think mostly, I'm operating under assumption that things are gonna continue to march on, that we can pick some of the low hanging fruit here on coordination and at least avoid the sort of most extreme race to the bottom on safety. Mental model I've been developing recently, it's very pretty simple in some ways, but interesting to get your take on it is I I basically think when it comes to really high scale risks from AI, you can kind of break it down into the irreducible, unavoidable risk, which is sort of the, you know, the fact that, like, we have web scale compute. We have web scale data. You know, people are gonna figure things out. And there might just be some things that just really don't go well. And if we stumble onto them, it could be really bad. And then there's also probably in that category, like, if you know, and you've used this kind of, you know, multiphase descriptor a couple times, like well resourced, determined, persisted, you know, nation state quality actor. I kinda think if, like, if we have a major national government turn, like, so bad that they wanna create bioweapons and, like, kill us all. Like, that's gonna be a really big problem.…

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