James Holland: evaluation

Transcript context

…Well, no. No, it’s not really uh-oh. I just think there’s too much retrospective view on this. And that’s fine because the whole point of history is you can look back and you can judge decisions that were made at a certain point through the prism of what subsequently happened, which, of course, the people that are making the decisions at the time can’t because they’re in that particular moment. So I don’t think Chamberlain did trust Hitler, but he wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. Britain was not obliged to Czechoslovakia at all. France was. France had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1924, but Britain had not. So there was no obligation at all for Britain to do this. The only reason why Britain would go to war over Czechoslovakia is because of the threat of Nazism and what the ramifications of not going to war with him. But the problem is, is that Chamberlain is interesting because in 1935, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer when they started to sort of think, “Okay, we really do need to rearm.” He was very much in favor of substantially expanding and rehabilitating the navy, so updating existing battleships and so on, and also developing the air force. There’s not really much argument for having a large army because if you have a large army, you’ve got to maintain it. Britain is a small place. Where do you put them? You’ve also got to transport them. That’s complicated. You’ve got to train them, you’ve got to put them in barracks, you’ve got to feed them, all this kind of stuff. There’s a kind of impracticality about having a large army. Whereas navy is great because you can keep them at sea, and they can be on the water. Air force is slightly different. Air power is viewed in very much the same way that naval power is viewed, that this is, we’re an island nation, we have a global assets and air power gives us the flexibility that an army doesn’t. So he is all for backing the expansion of the army, of the air force and the navy in 1930s. Then he subsequently becomes prime minister and sticks to his guns on that. It is he that enables the air force and the air ministry to develop the first fully-coordinated air defense system anywhere in the world. There is not an air defense system in Poland, nor Norway, nor Denmark, nor the Netherlands, nor Belgium, nor France. There is in Britain, Britain is the only one, and frankly, it pays off big time in the summer of 1940. So you have to give him credit for that. Britain interestingly is also the world’s leading armaments exporter in the 1930s, which is amazing really when you think everyone complains about the fact that we weren’t rearming enough. Actually, we were when we had all the infrastructure there and we were expanding that infrastructure dramatically. I say we. I’m only saying that because I’m British. So they were doing that. enough. Actually, we were when we had all the infrastructure there and we were expanding that infrastructure dramatically. I say we. I’m only saying that because I’m British. So they were doing that. In 1938, Britain wasn’t ready for war. Now you can argue that Germany wasn’t ready for war, either. But Chamberlain was prime minister in a democracy, a parliamentary democracy, where 92% of the population were against going to war in 1938. There was not a single democratic leader in the world that would go against the wishes of 92% of the population. Now you could say, ” Well, he should have just argued it better and presented his case better and all the rest of it.” But at that point, there was no legal obligation to go to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was another of these new nations that been created out of 1919 and the Versailles Treaty. Who was to say we, in Britain, are able to judge the rights and wrongs of that? How fantastic it would be to go to war with a nation a long way away for people whom we know very little, et cetera, et cetera? I’m paraphrasing his quote. But I’m not saying it was the right decision. I’m just saying I can see why, in September 1938, he is prepared to give him a chance. Now I do think he was a bit naive, and what he also does is this really interesting thing. So he goes over to Hitler’s flat, completely ambushes him. Goes to his flat on the afternoon of 30th of September and says to Hitler, “Look, I’ve got this, I’ve drawn up this agreement here, and this is to continue the naval agreement that we’ve already made. And by signing this, you are saying that Germany and Britain should never go to war with one another.” Hitler goes, “Yeah, whatever,” signs it. Chamberlain comes back, [inaudible 01:18:13] and waves this little piece of paper, peace in our time and all the rest of it, which obviously comes back to bite him in a very big way. But it’s interesting that when Hitler then subsequently goes and moves and that they, France and Britain decide in rather the same way that there’s been discussion about deciding that large portions of Ukraine should just be handed back, handed over to Russia without consulting Ukraine a few weeks ago, it is incredible, I think, that France and Britain and Italy with Germany are deciding that, yes, it’s fine for Germany to go in and take Sudetenland without really consulting the Czechs. It’s a sort of similar kind of scenario really, and it’s equally wrong. But when Germany does then go and take over the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, that’s the bottom line. That’s the point where Chamberlain goes, “Okay, I’ve given him the benefit of the doubt. No more benefits than doubt. That’s it. This is he’s crossed the line.” And so you reinforce your agreement with Poland, you do a formal agreement, you go, “Okay, we will uphold your sovereignty. If you are invaded, we will go to war with you.” And that is a ratcheting up of diplomacy in politics in a very, very big way. And it is that decision to make a treaty with the Poles is not heeded by Hitler, but it’s heeded by, literally, every one of his commanders. heting up of diplomacy in politics in a very, very big way. And it is that decision to make a treaty with the Poles is not heeded by Hitler, but it’s heeded by, literally, every one of his commanders. And it’s also heeded by Goring who is his number two, and who is obviously a commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe and is president of Prussia and all the rest of it and is the second-most senior Nazi. And he’s going, “This is a catastrophe. This is the last thing we want to be doing is going to war against Britain and, indeed, France.”…

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